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he Syrian case is a unique one. A country with a WMD-armed capability has never witnessed 
civil strife before. The active involvement of  terror groups like Hezbollah, Hamas and al-Qaeda 
in Iraq coupled with the weakening hold of  the Assad regime over large swathes of  the country T
makes the situation grim. This raises the very real spectre of  Syrian chemical weapons and missiles falling 
into the hands of  these terror groups. 
Given the ongoing civil war in the country, Syria's neighbours and the West have been concerned about 
1the safety and security of  the chemical and biological weapons in Syria.  In a bid to possibly allay these 
fears, the Syrian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Dr. Jihad Makdissi made a statement at a televised news 
2conference on July 23, 2012.  In the statement, Makdissi said, 
“Any chemical or bacterial weapon will never be used––and I repeat will never be used––during the 
crisis in Syria regardless of  the developments. All of  these types of  weapons are in storage and 
under security and the direct supervision of  the Syrian armed forces and will never be used unless 
3Syria is exposed to external aggression”.
The statement is crucial for several reasons. Most importantly, Makdissi's statement is the first public 
4admission by the Assad regime of  possessing stockpiles of  chemical and biological weapons.  While the 
statement reiterates the Syrian regime's long-standing policy of  not using chemical weapons against its 
own population, it also lays down an important “red line.” Possibly, learning from the treatment meted 
out to Tripoli after it gave up its chemical weapons, Syria has made it clear that it will not use these 
weapons “unless Syria is exposed to external aggression . 
Makdissi's statement can also be seen as an attempt on the part of  the Assad regime to reassure the 
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In this context, a recent statement by Amos Gilad, head of  the Israeli Defence Ministry's political-
5defence department that Syria does remain in full control of  its facilities assumes significance.  
Interestingly, media reports quoting American intelligence officials indicate that the al-Assad regime has 
in fact been consolidating its CW stockpile. The regime has been moving its chemical and biological 
6arsenal away from northern parts of  Syria which have seen more hostilities.  While the consolidation 
could be seen as attempts at securing the CBW stockpile by removing them from harm's way, it could also 
be seen as a means of  lending greater credibility to Syrian assertion of  its “red lines” and deter any foreign 
military intervention.  
Current Situation in Syria
The seventeen-month old civil war currently underway in Syria has seen several ups and downs. The 
fighting has definitely spread across Syria with more and more areas witnessing pitched battles between 
the rebel and Assad forces. Large swathes of  areas to the north and east of  Aleppo and in the centre of  
Syria between Idlib and Hama are under de facto rebel control. Major cities like Aleppo, Idlib, Homs, 
7Damascus, and Suwayda have been facing the brunt of  the civil war.  There have also been several high 
profile defections by senior diplomats like Syrian Ambassadors to Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, 
8Cyprus, Armenia and the Charge d'affairs in London.  
While the defection of  the Syrian diplomats might embarrass the regime, defection of  senior military 
brass like Major General Adnan Silou, former head of  Syria's chemical weapons programme and General 
al-Sheikh will hurt the regime more in the longer run. In addition, defector accounts point to about 
60,000 absentees with an additional 30,000 having joined the opposition forces leaving the ranks of  the 
Syrian Army. Despite the large number of  desertions and absenteeism from Syrian Army ranks, the 
Assad regime is believed to have several loyal units which comprise of  about 70,000 soldiers. Though 
these defections do point to weakening of  the vice like grip the Assad regime wields over the country, the 
9situation is likely to be a long drawn one, with the end nowhere in sight.
The Western media has tried to use the desertions from the Syrian Army and diplomatic corps to paint a 
picture of  an imminent collapse of  the Assad regime. However, it does not seem likely that the regime 
will disappear in a hurry. Firstly, the elite military and intelligence forces like the Republican Guards, the 
General Security Directorate, and the Fourth Division of  the Syrian Army continue to remain loyal to 
10Assad.  This is expected given that a majority of  the rank and file of  these elite forces are comprised of  
Alawi sect, with many in key positions belonging to Assad's own Numaylatillah clan and Matawirah tribe 
11 12within the Alawites.  In many cases, these elite forces are commanded by family members.  Over the past 
four decades, the Assad regime has cultivated loyalties amongst Sunni, Christian, and Druze 
businessmen especially in Damascus and Aleppo, the nerve centres of  Syrian economy and home to one-
13third of  Syrian population.  Given this situation, the continuing loyalty of  these groups cannot be 
discounted as it is in their interest that the regime continues in power. 
Recent bomb attacks by rebel groups on prominent government buildings which have led to deaths of  
senior members of  Assad's inner circle, while a definite setback to the regime, also point to the growing 
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capabilities and strength of  the rebel forces. On July 18, 2012, the Syrian regime suffered a serious 
setback when a powerful bomb blast in the headquarters of  the Syrian National Security Council in the 
al-Rawda area of  Damascus killed three members of  Assad's inner coterie. Those killed included his 
14Assad's brother-in-law General Assef  Shawkat and the Minister of  Defence Dawoud Rajha.  Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov captured the significance of  the attack when he stated that the attack 
15signified the beginning of  a “decisive battle” in Syria.  Since then there have been more such daring 
attacks by rebel forces especially targeting the regime's air force in a bid to neutralise the regime's 
airpower advantage. August has witnessed large attacks by rebel forces on an air base near Aleppo and the 
16Taftanaz air base in eastern Syria.
Syrian Chemical Weapons 
Syria has the largest chemical weapons programme in the Middle East with over fifty suspected chemical 
17and bio-weapon storage and production facilities.  It operates large CW production facilities at al-Safir, 
18Hama, Masyaf, Homs and Latakia.  In addition to two munition storage sites at Khan Abu Shamat and 
19Eurqlus, there are storage sites spread over a dozen sites across the country.  In addition, Syria also runs a 
chemical weapons research facility near Damascus.
Damascus's chemical weapons stockpile is believed to run into several hundred tones of  mustard 
blistering agents. Syria is also believed to possess large stockpiles of  the deadly nerve agents like Sarin and 
VX. It is suspected to have stored mustard agents in bulk form and other agents in 'binary' form which 
20make them safer to handle, transport and easier to use.  Syrian CW stockpile is believed to be deliverable 
21by aerial bombs, ballistic missiles and artillery rockets.   
Syria has never signed or ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It has declined to become 
party to the CWC until all weapons of  mass destruction have been eliminated from the Middle East. 
While Syria has signed the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1972, it has never 
22ratified the treaty.  Syria is a signatory to the 1925 Geneva Protocol which it signed in 1968. The Geneva 
Protocol bans the use of  chemical and bacteriological methods of  warfare.
The Syrian programme is believed to have begun in 1973 with the initial CW capability having been 
23 transferred from Egypt in the run-up to the October '73 war with Israel. Syria however did not use the 
weapons against Israel in the Yom Kippur War. The Syrian CW programme is believed to have got 
underway in late 1970s or early 1980s. It is believed to have received foreign assistance mainly from 
Egypt, the Soviet Union, North Korea and Iran. 
Syria has received considerable assistance in its CW programme from Russia and the former Soviet 
Union. Russia's Oriental Petrochemical Industry (VNKHK) and Syria's Environmental Studies 
Research Centre (ESRC) are believed to have collaborated on chemical weapon projects. It is suspected 
that Mustafa Tiaess of  the ESRC and former Soviet chemical warfare expert, Anatoliy Kuntsevich 
collaborated in the late 1990s which culminated with the Soviet expert allegedly providing Syria with CW 
24precursors prior to his death.  It is also suspected that the US$14.6 million in technical assistance and 
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equipment provided by the European Union to the Syrian Ministry of  Industry could have been diverted 
by Damascus to the CW program. Given the fears of  diversion, the EU built in checks into its agreement 
25to verify the actual end use of  the equipment.  However, such checks have been suspended as part of  the 
EU sanctions on Syria since May 2011. 
Syria and Iran have had a long standing cooperation in the field of  chemical weapons. Iran is believed to 
have assisted Syria in setting up four or five precursor chemical weapons facilities in the country. This 
assistance most likely involved assistance in form of  design support, equipment and visits by engineers 
from Iran's Defense Industry Organization (DIO). News reports also indicate an agreement between 
Iran and Syria to provide financial assistance to the tune of  US$ 1 billion which was reached during 
President Ahmadinejad's visit to Damascus in 2007. Syrian students are believed to have been trained at 
26the Higher Institute for Applied Science and Technology (HIAST) of  the University of  Tehran.  
Apart from selling variants of  Scud missiles to Syria, North Korea is suspected to have shared technical 
know-how about mounting CW warheads on missiles. Following the initial assistance and transfer of  
CW capability by Egypt prior to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt is believed to have recently hosted 
students from the Syrian Scientific Research Council (SSRC)-believed to be nerve centre of  Syria's CW 
27and BW programs-at the Egyptian National Research Center.  
Writing in the Journal of  Strategic Security, Caitlin A. Buckley seeks to draw lessons that could be applied 
to Syria from the Libyan intervention. Buckley says, “On an abstract level, the circumstances in Syria are 
similar to the circumstances in Libya that precipitated the NATO intervention considering that the 
citizens have been protesting poverty, lack of  democracy, and corruption, and their protests are being 
violently suppressed by a leader, and thus begging for a response from the international community to 
28interrupt the killings of  citizens”.  
However, Buckley goes on to say that, the situation in Libya and Syria are very different given that Russia, 
China and Iran are opposed to military intervention. The Arab League too is pushing for initiation of  
dialogue. Moreover, there is a fair amount of  sectarian tension in Syria. Given this, French Foreign 
Minister Alain Juppe, points to the dangers of  arming the opposition groups which he states “could 
29result in a catastrophe even larger than the one that exists today”.
One could not agree more with Buckley, in the realm of  chemical weapons, it would not be prudent to 
draw lessons from the Libyan example and try to use them in Syria. This is because of  the fact that the 
CBW capabilities that Libya and Syria possess are completely different. As a result of  the variance in their 
capabilities, the dangers that both countries pose are also qualitatively different. 
When Libya joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in January 2004, it made a declaration to 
the Organisation for the Prohibition of  Chemical Weapons (OPCW) wherein it declared its stockpiles 
and capabilities, which were subsequently verified by the OPCW. The Libyan chemical weapons stockpile 
largely comprised of  mustard gas. It included 24.7 metric tonnes (MT) of  sulphur mustard; 1,390 MT of  
precursor chemicals; 3,563 unloaded chemical weapons munitions (aerial bombs) and 3 former chemical 
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30weapons production facilities.  By the time the Libyan conflict began in February 2011, more than half  
of  the mustard gas stockpile and about 40% of  the precursor chemicals had been destroyed as a result of  
31OPCW verification and disablement programs.  One of  the three chemical weapons facilities had been 
irreversibly destroyed while the other two facilities had been converted into pharmaceutical plants after 
approval by the Executive Council of  the OPCW. Moreover, the location of  the remaining stockpile was 
well known, guarded and monitored throughout the conflict. Most importantly, Libya could only air-
drop these weapons which did not amount to an effective military threat. 
Unlike Libya, Syria has never signed or ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), it has signed 
but withheld ratification of  the BTWC. Damascus is however a member of  the 1925 Geneva Protocol. 
As compared to Libya, Syrian CW stocks are believed to be much larger and are weaponized to be 
delivered via ballistic missiles, artillery shells and aerial bombs. Most importantly, it is possible that there 
could still be Syrian CW production and storage facilities which remain unknown to the international 
community. 
Syrian Biological Weapons 
When it comes to the question of  the nature and extent of  the bio-weapons capabilities of  Syria, given 
the slow trickle of  credible information, the house is more divided. In 1990, US Defence Secretary, Dick 
Cheney, stated that Syria was amongst ten countries that “have, or may have, biological warfare 
32programs.”  In the 2011 unclassified report to the Congress on Acquisition of  technology related to 
WMD, the US Director of  National Intelligence (DNI) states that “Syria's biotechnical infrastructure is 
33capable of  supporting BW agent development”.  
On the other hand, experts like Leonard Spector, testifying before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, 
Nonproliferation, and Trade, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of  Representatives, concede 
that while biological weapons could be an issue before the international community while tackling the 
34Syrian case, there is little credible information on the extent of  the programme.  Dr. Jill Dekker, a 
consultant to NATO's Defense Establishment is of  the view that while very little is known publicly about 
the Syrian BW program, it does not lessen the dangers it poses in any way. The Syrian BW program is 
believed to be centered on the Syrian Scientific Research Council (SSRC) near Damascus. Dr. Dekker 
believes that the advanced nature of  the Syrian chemical weapons program has distracted the West from 
the nature and extent of  the country's biological weapons capability. Syrian BW capability draws upon 
former Soviet programs and has received support from North Korea and Iraq. Importantly, Syria is 
suspected to be fairly advanced in terms of  weaponization and dispersal techniques which were possibly 
35shared with Damascus by the Iraqis.  Though there is concern of  Syria possessing bio-weapons, credible 
information which enables one to assess the nature and scope of  the program remains scarce.   
Syrian Delivery Vehicles
Syria is believed to possess an estimated 700 Scud missiles and its variants like Scud-B, Scud-C and Scud-
36D in addition to the short-range solid fuelled SS-21.  This large arsenal of  Scud variants has been 
acquired by Syria through imports from North Korea as well as by way of  setting up a domestic 
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37production capability with the help of  the Chinese and the Iranians.  In the 1970s and '80s, Damascus 
38relied on its client status to acquire FROG-7, Scud-B and the SS-21 from the Soviets.  Iran in the 1990s is 
believed to have provided Damascus with the technical assistance to produce solid-fuelled rocket 
motors. Subsequently in 1991, Syria is suspected to have purchased about 150 Scud-C missiles from 
North Korea. In September 2000 and January 2007, Syria is believed to have tested a North Korean 
39700km Scud-D missile.
Of  the 700 odd missiles in Syria's arsenal, between 100-200 Scud missiles are believed to be capable of  
carrying warheads loaded with sarin nerve gas. Additionally, mustard gas and sarin are suspected to be 
40stockpiled in forms which could be used in air-dropped bombs and artillery shells.  As compared to 
Libya, which could only air-drop its munitions, Syria possesses missiles which can be used to deliver its 
chemical and biological weapons. This capability makes the situation much more dangerous and 
qualitatively different from the one which existed in Libya.
The road ahead is paved with dangers
Given the advanced nature of  Syria's chemical weapons and the large missile arsenal, one real danger is 
the likelihood of  these weapons falling into the hands of  the jehadi groups in case the Assad regime 
collapses. These groups are very much capable of  spiriting away these weapons into Iraq or Lebanon 
given Syria's porous borders. Another danger in light of  Makdissi's statements is the use of  these 
weapons by the Assad regime in case of  military intervention that puts the survival of  the regime at risk. 
There is also a possibility of  renegade commanders resorting to use of  the chemical weapons-if  the 
regime survival is in doubt–with Assad either being unaware of  the decision or unable, unwilling to 
prevent their usage even if  he is aware of  the decision. 
The international community led by the West has been trying very hard to drive home the point that using 
such weapons would be inimical to Syria's interests and Assad's survival. Many countries including the 
US and Russia have been trying to press Syria to abide by its commitment made under the Geneva 
Protocol in order to prevent any possible use of  chemical weapons by Damascus in the ongoing conflict. 
In a statement the Russian Foreign Ministry said, “The Russian side proceeds from the assumption that 
41Syrian authorities will continue to strictly adhere to the undertaken international obligations.”  The 
American Secretary of  State, Hillary Clinton speaking at a press conference along with the Turkish 
42Foreign Minister at Istanbul, said that the use of  chemical weapons would be a red line for the world.
The international community has definitely been on the overdrive to put in place plans to safeguard the 
Syrian WMD stockpile. Israeli leaders have even spoken of  plans to destroy Syria's capability in case of  a 
43collapse of  the Assad regime.  However, given the strong air defences Syria possesses, this would not be 
an easy task to carry out. Moreover, unlike Iraq (Osirak) or Syria (al-Kibar), Syrian chemical weapon 
facilities are dispersed across the country. The possibility that not all the storage and production facilities 
44might have been identified further complicates the issue.  Further, such strikes do not in any way 
guarantee the achievement of  the purported objective behind such a gambit, which is to prevent the 
weapons and their delivery platforms from falling into the hands of  the jehadi groups.  
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The situation in Syria is unprecedented. The active involvement of  jehadi terror groups like Hezbollah 
and the al-Qaeda, with an evinced interest in acquiring these weapons makes the situation extremely 
dangerous. The sudden collapse of  the Assad regime-as opposed to a gradual, coordinated power shift- 
could result in these weapons and the means of  delivering them, falling into the hands of  these groups. 
Though it does not seem that the world will see the back of  Bashar al-Assad any time soon, securing 
Syrian chemical weapons in case of  such an eventuality is something the world has to give some serious 
thought to. 
Even in a post-Assad situation, the dangers these weapons post are not likely to ease. Ensuring the new 
government gives up the CW stockpile and in a verifiable manner will be a tricky task given that the new 
administration might view these weapons as a bargaining chip to be used in any future negotiations with 
Israel. With the lack of  a central authority the weapons could also be used by the Sunni terror groups 
45against the Shiite (Alawaite) and Christian minority.  The situation in Syria is truly a WMD nightmare.
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